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Abstract
In this paper selective issues of long-run sustainability of monetary unions are analyzed. Using
theoretical insights and the experience of EMU up to now we argue that empirical evidence on
OCA criteria for EMU suggests that benefits for the countries participating in EMU outweigh costs
by a relatively large margin although by varying degrees from country to country. We also conclude
that the Stability Pact is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for EMU to succeed and that
EMU has been driven by political considerations. A sound financial sector is a precondition. With
regard to lessons to be drawn for Latin America and the Caribbean we first find that there has been
a strong push towards the floating cum inflation-targeting corner and to regional trade integration.
Moreover, it seems that, in contrast to EMU, the benefit-cost balance of a move to monetary union
is much less favorable in Latin America and the Caribbean and, most important, the political
dimension missing.
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1. Introduction
The world is in a state of flux regarding the choice of monetary and exchange rate
regimes. One option is giving up national currencies to join a monetary union Since
Mundell (1961) the literature has emphasized conventional OCA criteria in shaping this
decision. EMU, the largest historical experiment in giving up sovereignty in monetary (and
other) policy areas, has captured the imagination of policy makers and researchers alike. It
has also brought other issues, related to complementary areas of reform and integration, to
the forefront of theory and policy analysis. These issues shape the discussion about
monetary union and, more generally, on optimal regime choice for countries in other
regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
The purpose of this paper is to assess selective issues on the long-run sustainability
of monetary unions, in the light of theory and of the experience of EMU, and to draw its
lessons for regime choice, and monetary union in particular, for LAC. In section 2 we
briefly review recent world trends in exchange rate and monetary regimes and a summary
of estimates of the benefits and costs of EMU. This leads to discussing three important
issues that are crucial in the theory and EMU experience of monetary union, related to
complementary areas of policy coordination and integration among prospective union
members (Section 3). Then we discuss the issues that shape monetary and regime choice in
LAC, with particular consideration of recent trends and literature and the prospects for
monetary union in the light of the EMU experience. Section 5 concludes briefly.
2. Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes: From the Real World to Optimality
Considerations
2.1 World Trends in Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes
The world is in a state of flux regarding the choice of monetary (M) and exchange
rate (ER) regimes. Many countries and full regions have shifted regimes – gradually by
careful design (as in EMU) or quickly forced by markets (as in Ecuador 2000 or Argentina
2002). Here we review recent world trends in ER and M regimes. This will help in the
subsequent discussion of selective issues on monetary union illustrated by EMU and the
regime challenges faced by LAC.2
The world evolution in ER regimes is illustrated by IMF data on countries’ official
regime definitions (Figure 1). The share of fixed ER regimes in the world – comprising no
independent currency, currency boards, or pegged ERs – has declined from 68% of
countries in 1979 to 49% in 2001, while managed and independent floats have increased
from 17% to 42%. Intermediate regimes, where ERs are adjusted by indicators (sliding
pegs, bands, and sliding bands), have fallen from 15% of countries in 1979 to 9% in 2001.
As a long-term time trend, a shift to the floating ER corner is evident.
More recently, based on finer IMF data, their is some evidence favoring the two-
corner hypothesis: ERs adjusted by indicators have declined from 12% to 9% while
common currency cases have increased from 20% to 21% and managed floats have risen
from 14% to 17% between 1999 and 2001.
Official data on ER regimes have been criticized for being a poor indicator of ER
flexibility. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that nominally independent floaters among
emerging countries exhibit fear to float through various forms of ER interventions. They
provide evidence of low exchange rate volatility relative to international reserve volatility,
in comparison to industrial country floaters. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) take up
this point by constructing a new database of ER regimes, inferred from cluster analysis of
ER and reserve behavior. In their classification, de facto fixed ERs stand at 57% of the
world distribution in 2000 (above the IMF’s 49% for 2001) while de facto managed (dirty)
and independent (free) floats are 20% (well below the IMF’s 42%). However, they also
confirm a long-term trend decline in de facto fixed ERs and a rise in de facto independent
floats between 1979 and 2000.
1 Von Hagen and Zhou (2001) test the hollow-out hypothesis
for 25 transition economies in Europe and find that although corner regimes dominate in
the steady state intermediate regimes will not disappear completely.
2
The recent world evolution in monetary (M) regimes is reflected by a survey
conducted among 93 central banks in 1998 by Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and the larger
IMF data of annual country-based official regime definitions since 1999 (Figure 3). The
evidence shows a relative uniform distribution of conventional M regimes (ER, monetary
aggregate, and inflation targets) for 1998 in the Mahadeva and Sterne data. The IMF data
                                                
1 This trend is also confirmed by Fischer (2001).3
shows a dominance of ER targets that, however, tends to weaken between 1999 and 2001.
This is consistent with the growing trend away from monetary and ER anchors and toward
inflation targets observed during the last decade.
3
As of March 2001, the combined world distribution of ER and M regimes (IMF
classification) shows an obvious concentration of regime combinations on the diagonal of
Table 1. It is less evident, however, that the most popular combinations are a currency
board or a pegged ER with an ER target (51 countries), followed by no independent
currency (39 countries), and a managed float with no conventional or explicit monetary
regime (26 countries). In the corner of managed and independent floats, different
combinations of the two latter ER regimes with monetary regimes are observed.
Conditional probabilities of having one regime in place, given the choice of the
other regime, differ strongly in various cells of Table 3. For example, the conditional
probability of having an independent float when an inflation target is in place is 81%. The
opposite conditional probability – adopting an inflation target when an independent float is
in place – attains only 28%.
Managed floats – often based on non-disclosed or ad-hoc rules of interventions – are
strongly associated to no conventional or explicit monetary regime (26 of 31 countries).
This stands in contrast to independent floats, which are more likely to be associated to
explicit money or inflation targets (20 of 47 countries). Hence rule-based ER regimes tend
to be associated to rule-based monetary regimes.
There are various reasons for the large and still ongoing shifts in ER and M regimes
that are observed worldwide, including the following:
(i)  Multilateral adoption of a currency union, often as part of economic and eventual
political union (as in EMU);
(ii)  Transition toward monetary union in the future, leading to adoption of intermediate
exchange-rate regimes, as in some central and eastern European countries aiming toward
euro accession;
(iii)  Domestic weakness caused by a combination of fiscal dominance, weak banking
systems, inflexible ER system, and price and wage rigidities, leading to ER and financial
                                                                                                                                                    
2 Kuttner and Posen (2001) argue that exchange rate regimes, central bank autonomy and domestic targets
must not be considered in isolation but that they are interconnected and thus have to be analyzed jointly.4
crises. This contributes to abandonment of intermediate ER regimes in favor of one corner
(dollarization, e.g. Ecuador) or the other (floating ER, e.g. Argentina);
(iv)  Small countries that are highly integrated into and highly synchronous with the
world economy tend to adopt pegged ERs or abandon their  national currencies in favor of
adopting a dominant foreign currency or monetary union with similarly small states (e.g.,
ECCA). There are exceptions to the latter countries: those small open economies where
integration intensifies their high production specialization and asynchronicity with the
world economy (e.g. Iceland);
(v)  Among countries that have managed or independent floats in place, a monetary
regime shift from MA to inflation targeting.
Economic cost-benefit and political considerations drive countries to modify their
ER and M regimes. We discuss next the costs and benefits of one particular regime shift:
joining a monetary union, exemplified by EMU.
4
2.2  Overview of Costs and Benefits of Giving up a National Currency
Table 4 in the annex summarizes some of the empirical estimates of specific costs and
benefits in the EMU context (and elsewhere, if applicable). Major results are reported in the
bullet points below.
•  The traditional OCA literature (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963) argues that countries
joining a monetary union will benefit from lower transaction costs associated from
trading goods and assets in different currencies. Lower transaction costs would enhance
trade and therefore generate higher benefits from economic specialization.
•  Recent empirical evidence stresses the large positive effects of currency unions on trade
(Rose 2000, Glick and Rose 2001) and income (Frankel and Rose 2002). However, new
evidence suggests that Rose and associates might be grossly overestimating the impact
                                                                                                                                                    
3 As of early 2002, 20 countries have adopted inflation targeting regimes (Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia 2002).
4 There is a large body of recent literature on optimal exchange rate regimes that we will not review in this
article. For the case of emerging market economies see Larraín and Velasco (2002) and for Latin America see
French-Davis and Larraín (2002) and Escaith et al. (2002).5
of currency unions on trade due to sample selection and non-linearities (Persson 2001)
and the endogeneity of the decision to join the union (Tenreyro 2001).
•  Other potential microeconomic efficiency gains from joining a currency union are due
to elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility and hence lower interest rates, lower
real exchange rate volatility, deeper financial integration, and (in the case of joining a
dominant currency area, like the euro) international acceptance of the currency.
•  The microeconomic efficiency gains of a currency union might be offset by lower
macroeconomic flexibility. Countries joining a currency union lose their ability to
stabilize output through an independent monetary policy and give up nominal exchange
rate flexibility. In sum, the traditional approach states that countries with close
international trade and financial links are more likely to be members of an OCA
whereas countries with asymmetric business cycles are less likely ( Artis and Toro
2000).
•  For candidates of a currency union microeconomic benefits increase and
macroeconomic costs decline with their degree of trade integration and business cycle
symmetry. Empirical studies for the EU show that countries with closer trade linkages
exhibit highly correlated business cycles.
•  OCA criteria are dynamic: net benefits a of currency union increase after joining the
union because trade integration and business cycle correlation become higher than
before joining the union (Frankel and Rose 1998, 2002, Rose and Engel 2001).
•  Non-traditional OCA factors that determine the choice to join a currency union include
the distribution of seigniorage, interregional fiscal transfers, and substituting the
traditional lender of last resort. The net effect of the former seems to be very small but
unevenly distributed, especially as seigniorage is shared among EMU participants, there
are different views regarding the importance of the latter two factors.
•  There is fairly conclusive evidence that benefits of EMU outweigh costs by a relatively
large margin. This seems to be especially true for smaller members at the center of the
union, where the loss of the exchange rate instrument does not have any significant
costs (e.g. Austria, Benelux).
•  However net benefits of monetary union are not the same for all members. EMU
members at the periphery may not be as strongly viable members in the long run in6
comparison to the states of the U.S. ( Kouparitsas 1999). Analogously, EMU is
estimated to be successful for all original 12 EU countries only if fiscal reforms are
pursued in order to attain larger comovement among all members (Haug et al. 2000).
•  Output variability decreases through the aggregation effect and the mean of stochastic
variables fluctuates by less than its components.
•  The loss of seigniorage is marginal once price stability has been reached and minimum
reserve requirements are harmonized and remunerated. Differences in preferences
regarding cash holdings (currently the predominant reason for "winners and losers")
might diminish over time as the importance of cash is being reduced (plastic money,
etc.) but not eliminated (need for cash in the underground and criminal economies).
•  Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2002) estimate the growth effects of EU membership using an
endogenous growth model and panel data. They find a growth bonus from EU
membership which is relatively higher for poorer member countries and which is
permanent.
3.  Fundamental Issues On Long-Run Sustainability of a Monetary Union
This section discusses three key issues that are crucial in the theory and experience
of European economic and monetary union: the role of fiscal policies, labor market issues
and financial market integration and supervision.
5
The euro area is now characterized by one common currency and one monetary
policy. Albeit sovereignty of member countries is constrained by the law of the EU, they
remain separate political entities pursuing independent policies. Hence the issue arises
whether a monetary union can work without a political union. A political union does not
seem to be necessary for the success of a monetary union, especially if the three
fundamental issues are resolved.
                                                
5 We do not discuss trade and goods market integration, because EMU seems to suggest that this integration is
a prerequisite for forming a MU and reaping its benefits.7
3.1. Role of Fiscal Policies: Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic, Monetary Dominance, and
Fiscal Coordination
The relationship between fiscal and monetary policies in monetary unions has been
an object of many studies in recent years. Much of this is a reaction to the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992 and the Pact for Stability and Growth (SGP), adopted by the EU-Council
1997.
6 The Treaty institutionalized binding fiscal rules for monetary convergence; the Pact
specified these rules and empowers the Council to impose sanctions for non-compliance as
a non-interest bearing deposit (maximum 0.5% of GDP) which is converted into a fine after
two years, unless the excessive deficit has been corrected.
Are such fiscal rules really necessary for the success of a MU? Some authors
suggest that they may be a nuisance (see Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998). Some argue
from the perspective of static macroeconomics, on which the theory of optimum currency
areas is built. According to this view no restrictions on the use of fiscal policies should be
imposed: IS and LM curves can be shifted independently. Of course, for reasons of policy
efficiency, policy coordination should seek optimal policy mixes. Yet, given that monetary
policy is centralized in MUs and, in the case of EMU, shaped by the ESCB, it is argued that
“nationalized” or even “regionalized” fiscal policies should be fixed individually and
complemented by an interregional fiscal transfer mechanism to cope with asymmetric
shocks within the MU.
From a neoclassical perspective, binding fiscal rules could also be unwarranted. If
Ricardian Equivalence holds, fiscal deficits are macroeconomically irrelevant and have no
effects on real interest rates. If it does not hold but financial markets are efficient, sovereign
credit risk will be priced like any other financial risk and reflected by interest rate spreads
or by credit rationing. Why should there exist bureaucratic and political procedures, based
on an ambiguous pact, which determine “excessive deficits” and result in fining states?
Would big EU members really comply with fiscal rules or, if needed, just demonstrate their
political muscle? Instead, these authors argue, one should trust in the functioning of market
mechanisms.
                                                
6 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997; Official
Journal C 236, 02/08/1997: 0001-00028
In contrast to these views, there is now a growing literature on why fiscal rules
make sense in a monetary union. Obviously, issues about imperfect financial markets,
especially with the pricing of sovereign credit risks can be raised. Yet, another basis of
justifying fiscal rules are insights of dynamic macroeconomics. E.g., Sargent-Wallace’s
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic argues that a restrictive monetary policy, yielding a small
inflation tax (seigniorage) only, may be insufficient to balance exogenously determined
primary public deficits. Public debt may explode. To avoid this, monetary policy needs to
adapt at some future date, providing more seigniorage. Then monetary policy yields to
fiscal policy in a game of chicken between monetary and fiscal authorities (Sargent-
Wallace 1981). Winckler-Hochreiter-Brandner (1998) reversed this analysis. They
demonstrate that the architecture of EMU implies the opposite, i.e. an unpleasant fiscal
arithmetic. In Euroland, fiscal authorities have to yield to the ESCB at some date. Dixit
(2001) extensively analyzes games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU,
indicating that freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the  ESCB’s monetary
commitment. Dixit thereby justifies fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). In addition, the coordination among regional fiscal authorities seems necessary.
Woodford (1995, 1998), Canzoneri-Diba (1996), Buiter (1998) in a critical review,
recently Daniel (2001), and many others have contributed to develop the fiscal theory of the
price level. According to Woodford’s model, economies are always confronted by various
random shocks which trigger unexpected variations in the level of net deficits and public
debt. Fiscal sustainability requires two possible reactions in the case of negative shocks: (1)
higher inflation taxes respectively more seigniorage, based on a shift to a more
expansionary monetary policy stance, thus diminishing the burden of nominal debt or (2)
introduction of fiscal policies aimed at reducing primary deficits in subsequent periods. The
former would indicate a fiscal dominant regime, since monetary policy adapts, whereas the
latter describes a monetary dominant regime, since fiscal policies change. The term
"dominance" reminds us of the term “unpleasant arithmetic”.
Unfortunately, empirical tests aimed at assessing regime shifts from fiscal to
monetary dominance in the EU (or the other way around) are highly inconclusive, see9
Canzoneri-Diba (1996)
7. A visual inspection of aggregate EU data suggests however,
(although only few observations are taken into account) that in 1993, when the Maastricht
Treaty became effective, a regime shift from fiscal to monetary dominance took place.
Monetary dominance was reinforced in 1996 as is visually illustrated in the figure below.
Fiscal rules in monetary unions are necessary, but that does not imply a formal SGP.
A formal SGP hence is not necessary, but is it sufficient? Based on the seminal paper by
Mundell (1961) some argue that the SGP is not sufficient to maintain a monetary union
since it lacks a transfer mechanism to cope with asymmetric shocks. However, Kletzer and
von Hagen (2001) argue that the welfare effects of such fiscal insurance schemes are quite
ambiguous. The authors conclude that this is the main reason why in contrast to Mundell´s
claim and popular arguments in the policy debate no substantial fiscal insurance schemes
against asymmetric shocks are necessary in a MU. The SGP is thus sufficient.
                                                
7 First, most EU countries adapted their measures of public debt to Maastricht standards in 1990, thereby
precluding comparison of pre and post-1990 debt series. Second, only annual data are available. To increase
the number of observations, a panel study should be pursued. However, due to many special circumstances in
the individual EU states a host of dummy variables have to be included. Third, one needs to concentrate on
statistical procedures to test for structural breaks.
Primary Surplus and Debt Ratio










50,0 55,0 60,0 65,0 70,0 75,0
































Another criticism has been that the SGP unnecessarily constrains national fiscal
policy in case of idiosyncratic shocks. However, one can argue that,  under normal
circumstances, the SGP does not unduly constrain fiscal policy. E.g., if the Pact´s goal of
close to balance or in surplus  over the medium term, i.e., over the business cycle, is
reached, then automatic stabilizers can work unconstrained without endangering the 3%
deficit limit. In addition the Treaty stipulates that, under exceptional circumstances, the 3%
deficit limit may be overshot without invoking the excessive deficit procedure.
3.2. Labor Mobility, Wage Flexibility and Integration
The elimination of the nominal exchange rate as an instrument to absorb
idiosyncratic shocks raises the question about how such shocks can be dealt with without
straining MU. Mundell (1963) argued that a MU is feasible as long as there is sufficient
labor market mobility and/or aggregate and relative real wage flexibility. In contrast to the
US, Europe is said to lack both (Layard et al. 1994; Tyrväinen 1995) and thus EMU is
bound to raise unemployment and political tensions (Feldstein 1997 and 1998). While labor
mobility in Europe has been low and has hardly changed even since the establishment of
the single market, there is some evidence that real wage flexibility has increased in recent
years.
At the same time there remain uncertainties regarding the evolution of trade unions.
First, it is still an open question how trade unions have responded to the establishment of
EMU: Cukierman and Lippi (2001) argue that EMU alters the strategic interactions among
wage bargaining partners. In a MU, trade unions become relatively smaller, feel
macroeconomically less responsible and thus will be more aggressive when negotiating
wage contracts. As a result, unemployment will rise. Knell (2001) extends this model to
open economies and, in contrast, finds that the establishment of EMU has had no effect on
unemployment, essentially because a shadow MU existed before 1999. Well before 1999
trade unions were concerned with international competitiveness and price stability, which
was guaranteed by the anchor central bank (the Bundesbank). As a consequence there was
no regime shift for these countries when Stage Three of EMU started.
Yet, there are at least two issues regarding the evolution of trade unions and the
centralization and decentralization of wage bargaining processes, respectively, in EMU.11
The first relates to the question of whether trade unions will remain nationally segmented or
whether they will attempt to "regain their relative size" by cooperating and eventually
merging across EMU. Calmfors (2001) argues that transnational wage setting seems
unlikely due to prohibitive coordination costs. If at all, one could imagine trans-EMU wage
bargaining taking place in multinational firms.
The second issue relates to unemployment as a regional (and sectoral) problem
(Soltwedel et al. 1999). Unemployment rates show large intra-EMU dispersion, with very
high rates observed in weak regions like Eastern Germany, the Mezzogiorno and various
regions in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The European Commission (2000), the IMF (1999),
and the OECD (1999) have identified European unemployment as a predominantly
structural problem which can only be tackled through fundamental labor market reform. At
the same time highly different unemployment rates call for a decentralization of wage
bargaining and wage setting, down to firm levels, to allow for larger relative wage
dispersion (Davies and Hallet, 2001).
To conclude: Stage Three of EMU did not imply regime shifts in labor markets of
those participating countries that had a long history of pegging their currency to the DEM
(e.g. Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands). Labor mobility did not change and, in any case, is
not necessary for a smooth functioning of EMU. The really important issues are real wage
flexibility and structural adjustment. While some progress has been made much more is
needed.
3.3 Financial Integration and Supervision
Financial market integration is a worldwide phenomenon, driven by globalization
and technological progress. Adoption of the euro added another catalytic dimension for
financial integration in the Eurozone. Following its introduction in January 1999, the
(unsecured) money markets integrated almost immediately and smoothly ( Gaspar et al.
2001) into a single market as reflected by the substantial decline in bid-ask spreads (Galati
and  Tsatsaronis 2001). Bond markets have widened and deepened appreciably but
government bonds remain only imperfect substitutes for each other. Yield differentials of
equal quality sovereign bonds persist. E.g. German and Dutch government bonds  are both
rated AAA but continue to be differently priced. At the same time there was a sharp rise in12
non-sovereign bond issues. The euro quickly emerged as the second most important bond
issuance currency after the US dollar. Yet progress has been uneven. The "Lamfalussy
Report" (2001) finds that the process of financial market integration remains slow and
incomplete.  Padoa-Schioppa (2002) identifies market-related factors (fragmented
infrastructure for cross-border clearing and settlement of security transactions) and policy-
related conditions (regulatory obstacles) as inhibiting factors. This is also true for other
financial sectors and, in particular, in the field of banking and capital-market supervision.
The European cross-border clearing and settlement infrastructure, which is essential
for smoothly and efficiently functioning securities markets, remains highly fragmented.
There are some 20 different systems in operation at the present time (Giovannini Report
2001, von Thadden 2001) resulting in expensive and cumbersome cross-border transactions
and clearing procedures. Major steps in integration and consolidation of the infrastructure
have yet to be undertaken.
The unified monetary policy of the euro area is confronted with regulatory and
supervisory authorities which are specialized both nationally and across sectors. This does
not pose a problem as long as financial markets remain nationally segmented. In this case
the principle of home country control and host country responsibility greatly overlap (De
Grauwe 2000). Increasing cross-border mergers or market integration, however, blur
responsibilities and may contribute to slower and less efficient crisis management.
The ECB´s regulatory and supervisory roles are defined in Protocol No. 3 of the
Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. Art. 3 only states that “the ESCB shall contribute to the
smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system”. Art. 25 lays
down the consultative role of the ECB in prudential supervision. Thus regulatory and
supervisory functions are assigned to national authorities. While precise institutional
responsibilities differ markedly across EMU, national central banks are involved in one
way or another in all Eurozone countries
8 (Hochreiter 2000), a point which is also
frequently stressed by the ECB.
                                                
8 This remains true also after the recent changes in the supervisory structures in Austria and Germany where
an independent  Financial Market Authority was established.13
This set of separated institutional arrangements has drawn severe criticism. Favero
et al. (2000) argue that European integration will intensify competition among financial
institutions, reducing profits and raising systemic risk. The problems will grow once cross-
border mergers proliferate. Hence the latter authors call for more centralization of
prudential supervisory structures, possibly by assigning a larger role to the ECB. Benink
and Whilborg (2002) argue that market discipline should play a bigger role when regulating
banks.
Yet, the ”Brouwer Report” on Financial Stability (European Commission 2000)
concludes that "the existing institutional arrangements provide a coherent and flexible basis
for safeguarding financial stability in Europe.  No institutional changes are deemed
necessary". (European Commission 2000: 7; emphasis added). Europe, however, does need
a strengthening of cross-sector and cross-border cooperation of financial regulators and
supervisors (European Commission 2000).
Once a crisis hits there is a need for effective crisis management and emergency
financing. Bruni and de Boissieu (2000) distinguish three financing channels to defuse a
crisis: tax payers money, private capital and central bank financing through its Lender of
Last Resort (LOLR) function. While there are a number of arguments in favor and against
the central bank’s LOLR function, there is a broad agreement on its need at the
macroeconomic but not at the microeconomic level (Freixas 2001). In the Eurozone (more
precisely in the ESCB) there are no clear provisions for a LOLR function and, in particular,
how the function is allocated between the ECB and national central banks (Bruni and De
Boissieu 2000) As far as the ESCB is concerned, the Treaty does not assign LOLR
responsibilities. This view of a de facto decentralized function raises concerns about the
handling of a fast-developing liquidity crisis (Prati and Schinasi 2000). Yet, while past
experience – before EMU – has shown that central banks have been quick and efficient in
defusing national and international crises, it remains an open question if past pre-EMU
experience can offer much guidance in EMU.
Our own conclusion is that no major change of the European institutional regulatory
and supervisory architecture is in the offing at the present time. The same is true for a more
precise delineation of LOLR functions in the ESCB. The first major (systemic) crisis will
provide the litmus test regarding the adequacy of current institutional arrangements and the14
improvements now being implemented in the field of supervision (e.g. the round table of
chairs of supervisory committees, the strengthening of central bank involvement in some of
the euro area countries).
Section 4: Recent Trends and Future Options of Monetary Regimes in Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC)
In this section we review recent trends in monetary and exchange rate regimes in
LAC and discuss future regime, with particular attention to MU, in the light of the recent
literature and the EMU experience.
4.1. Exchange Rate and Monetary Regime Trends in LAC.
The world trend away from pegged ER regimes and toward more flexible
arrangements noted in section 2 is even more pronounced in LAC.
9 Regarding M regimes,
the world trend toward inflation targeting among floaters is also more intense in LAC.
In 1994  LAC’s dominant regime combination was an ER regime of limited
flexibility (adjustable peg or band) combined with an ER or a monetary growth target
(Table 3). Since then LAC has evolved according to the two-corner hypothesis. In 2002
five countries that comprise 87% of regional GDP (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and
Peru) are positioned close to the lower-right hand corner, having adopted a managed float
with inflation targeting. Their typically independent central banks have invested in
strengthening their domestic currencies by stabilizing under inflation targeting and
modernizing their monetary policy frame. At the same time they have made progress
toward a floating ER regime where “fear to float” is mostly reflected by occasional but at
times intensive exchange rate interventions (Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner 2002).
Three small countries that represent 2% of regional GDP have adopted the U.S.
dollar (the upper left-hand corner in Table 3): Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama. Many
smaller economies, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, may follow suit. 6
                                                
9 According to the IMF classification, the share of countries with fixed ER regimes, among 18 LA countries,
fell from 67% in 1979 to only 16% in 2002, the share of independent floaters increased from zero in 1979 to
32% in 2000, and intermediate regimes of ER adjustment by indicators have remained stable at 27%, while
managed floats have increased from 27% to 44%.15
very small island economies in the Caribbean form the ECCU monetary union whose
currency is pegged to the US dollar.
Smaller LAC economies with diversified trade and that suffer from idiosyncratic
shocks (and therefore are not highly synchronous with the US or world economy), face stiff
tradeoffs regarding their regime choice between the upper left and lower right corners.
Among the latter are Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Bolivia that have currently in place ER
regimes of limited flexibility under various nominal anchors for their monetary policy. Two
large economies in currently critical situation – Argentina and Venezuela – have recently
been forced off their rigid ER regimes but their final choice of ER and M regimes is still
open.
In sum: LAC is a very heterogeneous region where countries differ widely in size,
structure, and politics. Hence they also vary significantly in economic factors and political
conditions that shape their choice of M and ER regimes.
4.2. Regional trade blocks and accession to outside blocks
Like in the European experience, monetary regime choices are strongly determined
by trade integration and accession. A strong push toward unilateral trade opening, bilateral
trade agreements, regional agreements, and accession to free trade with the US and the EU
is observed in LAC since the 1990s. Total trade has increased significantly in most LAC
countries during the last two decades. Regional common-market agreements – Mercosur,
the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market, and CARICOM – determine
some regional initiatives of macroeconomic coordination and eventual adoption of a
common regional currency. However a large gap separates reality from rhetorics in all
regional trade agreements, marred by frequent political setbacks and administrative
violations of agreements that severely hamper trade integration. In fact, LAC’s regional
agreements lag behind the level of European trade integration attained by the 1957 Treaty
of Rome. This offers a stark contrast to the free-trade agreement NAFTA, which has been
highly successful in binding Mexico more closely into the economies of the U.S. and
Canada. The prospects for a continental agreement towards a Free Trade Area for the
Americas (FTAA) to be reached in 2005 and similar free trade arrangements to be attained16
at continental or regional (Mercosur) levels with the EU bring the discussion of currency
choice and its costs and benefits to the forefront.
4.3. Costs and Benefits of Giving up National Currencies in LAC
There are few studies for LAC countries or regions on OCA criteria, micro benefits,
and macro costs of unilateral dollarization or adopting a common currency. However some
recent work focuses on some OCA criteria for the region and assesses the benefits of sub-
regional monetary union and unilateral dollarization.
Ahmed (1999) analyzes the sources of economic fluctuations in LAC’s three largest
economies – Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico – to assess the implications for their choice of
ER regimes. External shocks account only for 20% of output fluctuations and US interest
rate shocks have anomalous effects (first expansionary, then  contractionary) on Latin
American output levels. These findings point against the choice of fixed ERs, MU or
unilateral dollarization in these three countries. However real ERs are found to be only
weakly responsive to US interest rate and terms-of-trade shocks in the three countries,
weakening arguments that favor floats.
10
As opposed to the findings by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose and Engel (2001)
for the EU, Calderón et al. (2002) show that the impact of trade integration on business
cycle synchronization is much smaller in developing countries in general and, in the case of
LAC, is not significantly different from zero.
11 For Caricom countries, Kendall (2000) finds
little evidence of exchange rate convergence, confirming the more general results by Rose
and Engel (2001) quoted above.
Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) assess the pros and cons of unilateral
dollarization and joining a MU for Chile. High production and export specialization in
commodities and highly idiosyncratic external and domestic shocks explain the negative (or
low positive) output correlation between Chile and prospective currency partners in
                                                
10 These and subsequent findings are subject to the standard limitation that they are based on historical
samples under national currencies and unstable domestic policies, reflected in low trade integration and low
business cycle correlation. OCA benefits are potentially endogenous to monetary regimes.
11 This can be rationalized by differences in the pattern of trade. LAC and developing-country trade is
relatively more intensive in homogeneous primary goods than by differentiated manufactured goods. Hence
trade opening causes more specialization in the former categories, leading to lower cyclical output correlation
with trading partners.17
Mercosur, the U.S. or the EU. Chile is found to be a less likely candidate for currency
union or unilateral dollarization than Argentina, Brazil or Mexico.
4.4. Monetary Union in Mercosur and Nafta
In discussing the options of a monetary union for Mercosur, Eichengreen (1998)
finds that Mercosur members exhibit unusually large real exchange rate volatility,
reflecting, inter alia, the influence of idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks. Levy Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2000) find that Mercosur countries fail the tests implied by OCA criteria.
Intra-Mercosur trade integration is very low in comparison to the EU, as documented by
Belke and Gros (2002), and hence much larger intra-Mercosur exchange-rate variability is
required. Mercosur institutions and policies are weaker than those in the EU, making
Mercosur more subject to idiosyncratic shocks that require more exchange-rate flexibility.
Weak output correlation and nationally segmented labor markets reduce the scope for labor
markets to absorb asymmetric shocks that are larger in Mercosur than in Nafta or EMU.
Mercosur countries exhibit large differences in fiscal policy, banking strength, prudential
financial regulation, and labor market flexibility, exemplified in extremis by Argentina’s
current crisis. Before achieving significant progress in domestic reform and international
coordination in these areas, a common Mercosur currency remains  a distant dream.
Recent studies assess the costs and benefits for Canada and Mexico to join the U.S.
in a MU (Buiter 1999,  Morales 1999,  Chriszt 2000). Regarding prerequisites, much
progress in financial and labor market integration has to be achieved and the issue of LOLR
has to be addressed before adopting a Nafta MU. Even if economic arguments favor such a
union, political factors may be the largest remaining hindrance. At present, the will to
relinquish monetary sovereignty to the U.S. is not well developed in its two partners and
the U.S. does not appear enthusiastic to share its monetary  sovereignty. Buiter argues that
the difficulty in attaining political accountability by a North American central bank ensures
that a Nafta MU is highly unlikely.
4.5. Dollarization
Substitution of the US dollar for national currencies has a long history in LAC.
Currency and asset substitution was a rational response to high domestic inflation, weak
banks, and pervasive devaluation fears. De facto dollarization of transactions and asset18
holdings exhibits hysteresis and hence is difficult to reverse (Calvo and Végh 1992). Large
de facto dollarization is widespread in small and medium-sized LAC economies, for
example in Bolivia, Guatemala and Uruguay. In addition, all LAC economies hold large
amounts of US dollar-denominated net foreign liabilities, exposing them to significant
wealth losses in the wake of currency devaluation. De facto dollarization and large dollar
debts often dominate conventional OCA criteria when evaluating official dollarization – as
recently demonstrated by El Salvador. Panizza et al. (2000) argue that official dollarization
in Central American and Caribbean economies may reduce inflation and financial fragility
by reducing the volatility of key relative prices. Edwards (2001), confirming the inflation
gain from dollarization, argues against dollarization by providing evidence that dollarized
countries grow at significantly lower rates and are not spared from major current account
reversals.
4.6. Lessons from EMU and Prospects for Regime Choice in LAC
The EMU experience offers lessons for prospective MU plans in LAC. First, a
sound fiscal policy plays a dominant role among the prerequisites for successful MU.
Maastricht and the SGP engineered a reversion from fiscal to monetary dominance in the
Eurozone. LAC has accomplished on average significant progress towards fiscal stability
during the last decade but many countries remain fiscally fragile – Argentina is just the
extreme case of fiscal profligacy and conflict.
Second, EMU is not an example regarding labor market flexibility, as noted above.
Neither is LAC, where two models of labor markets are observed. In non-English speaking
countries (i.e., most of LAC), labor markets are beset by rigid legislation and rules,
modeled on the Continental European example, that contribute to wage rigidity,
unemployment, and large informal employment. This stands in stark contrast to small
English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, where labor legislation and practices follow
the liberal Anglo-American model (IDB 1996, Heckman and Pages 2001).
Third, EMU shows that a sound financial sector is a precondition for efficient
financial intermediation (required to reap the micro benefits of a MU) and low likelihood of
future banking crises (required to maintain fiscal solvency). This stands in contrast to LAC,
where most banking sectors are fragile – beset by large bad debts and exposed to significant19
maturity, currency, and credit risks. Moreover, prudential regulation and supervision of
banks and capital markets follow different standards in different LAC economies.
Fourth, with much progress in price stabilization – LAC’s average inflation rates
have fallen from more than 100% per annum in the 1980s to single-digit levels in recent
years – seigniorage is now a negligible source of fiscal revenue in most LAC economies.
But this does not mean that the sacrifice of seigniorage when unilaterally dollarizing is
uncontroversial in LAC. Few countries – particularly not the larger ones – are willing to
give away their seigniorage revenue without compensation from the U.S. or a say in
monetary policy – both still unacceptable propositions for the U.S.
This leads to our fifth inference: the difficult politics of MU. EMU is and now and
the future a foremost political agreement, of which economic integration and MU are only
part of. Europe’s growing willingness to sacrifice national sovereignty – in macroeconomic
management, structural policies, and, eventually, politics – puts MU on a very different
footing than what LAC is currently aiming at. There is scarce evidence that LAC countries
are at present willing to sacrifice sovereignty in economic matters – much less so in politics
– even if the net benefits of closer integration were obvious to everybody. Why? For two
reasons: the still ongoing task of developing nation states and large country heterogeneity.
Some countries are beset by domestic conflicts that require massive efforts in addressing
their roots in order to build up or rebuild their nation state. And those countries that have
largely accomplished the latter task and have reformed their economies have little
incentives to join their weaker neighbors in closer integration and MU.
Finally, a positive lesson emerges from theory and country experience in Europe
and LAC. There is no conflict between the long-term strategies that lead to strengthening
national currencies and joining a MU. To a large extent, the preconditions for successful
national monetary policy under inflation targeting cum floating exchange rate are identical
to the prerequisites for joining a MU: lack of fiscal dominance, strong prudential regulation
and supervision of financial markets, flexible labor markets, high international factor
mobility, large trade integration. This is clearly exemplified by countries in Central Europe
– like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – that are reforming their economies and
have adopted inflation targeting to strengthen domestic monetary policy in their transition
to EU accession and eventual euro adoption.20
Section 5: Conclusions
The paper started by documenting the worldwide move away from intermediate
exchange-rate regimes and largely toward floating exchange rates. This move to the corners
can be explained by initial conditions and optimality considerations – both tend to be very
different in different countries. In LAC, for instance, unilateral dollarization was adopted
because of the result of bad initial macroeconomic conditions (like in Ecuador) or because
of longer-term optimality considerations based on OCA criteria (like in El Salvador). At the
other extreme, adoption of a floating cum inflation targeting can be the result of an initial
crisis situation (as in Brazil) or as a gradual evolution toward more flexibility and monetary
policy independence (as in Chile).
Our review of the empirical evidence on OCA criteria for EMU members leads to
the unsurprising but strong conclusion that the evidence that benefits of EMU outweigh
costs by a relatively large margin although net benefits are not similar for all members. This
result may have been influenced by the fact that the majority of the present members of
EMU have been in a quasi-MU with Germany long before Stage Three of EMU started due
to their fixed exchange rate arrangements.
Our review of three key issues that are crucial in the theory and experience of
European economic and monetary union led us to the following conclusions:
•  First, while fiscal rules are necessary in EMU, the SGP is sufficient but not necessary.
•  Second, it is not so much labor mobility that is important for a smooth functioning of
EMU but rather real wage flexibility and structural adjustment.
•  Third, no major change of the European institutional regulatory or its supervisory
architecture structure from national to supranational "dominance" is in the offing. Yet,
this does not jeopardize monetary union, at least for the time being.
Finally, what are the prospects for regional or sub-regional monetary union in LAC?
Recent trends confirm even more strongly for LAC than for the rest of the world the  two-
corner hypothesis, particular the flight to the floating cum inflation-targeting corner. A
strong push toward bilateral and multilateral regional trade agreements and trade
agreements with the US and the EU have been reached during the last decade and are
expected to be signed in the near future. However, with exception of highly successful21
NAFTA, the multilateral intra-regional trade agreements have been marred by political
setbacks and administrative violations that severely hamper effective trade integration.
Some empirical evidence on the costs and benefits of giving up national currencies in LAC
show significantly less favorable conditions for LAC countries than for EU nations. Low
intra-regional trade, large idiosyncratic shocks, major differences in institutions and
policies, and large heterogeneity in development levels point against intra-regional
monetary union under current conditions. Dollarization seems to be more feasible for those
smaller LAC economies that are highly correlated and integrated with the U.S. and/or are
pushed to abandon their national currencies because of unfavorable domestic conditions.
However for the majority of medium-sized and large economies, neither intra-regional
monetary union nor dollarization appear to dominate their recent decision to strengthen
national currencies by adopting a floating exchange rate with inflation targeting. However,
in doing so and succeeding to lock in macroeconomic stability and relative price flexibility,
the latter countries may be on the best course to start a successful path toward intra-regional
monetary union in the long term.22
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Figure 1
Country Distribution by Exchange Rate Regimes

















Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics.
(1): For 1979 and 1986, the “No Independent Currency” and “Currency Board/Pegged”
categories were both classified as “Fixed” by the IMF.27
Figure 2
Country Distribution by Exchange Rate Regimes,
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Figure 3
Country Distribution by Monetary Regimes,
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics and Mahadeva and Sterne (2000).
(1): Data set only considers countries (or monetary areas) with an independent currency.
Sum of percentages exceeds 100% as countries can fit in more than one class.29
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39 51 17 31 47
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics.
Note: There are 185 countries and 187 cases for the monetary regimes, and 185 countries
(cases) for the exchange rate regimes.
In bold: number of cases. First percentage: likelihood of exchange rate regime conditional
on corresponding monetary regime. Second percentage: likelihood of monetary regime
conditional on corresponding exchange rate regime.30
Table 3









































































Source: Mishkin and Savastano (2000), Mahadeva and Sterne (2000), and central banks.
Note: each country is classified under its dominant nominal anchor.31
Table 4
Benefits and Costs of a Monetary Union
Empirical estimates for EMU





1. Savings on transaction cost
•  Inter-bank transactions
•  Foreign exchange transactions
(1) p. 21 + 0.5 % p.a.
2. Savings from enhanced competition





3. Effect of enhanced financial market
integration










only has a temporary
effect on trade
variables.
Being a member of a
CU reduces st. dev. of
RER by 2.5-6.0%
5. Gains from enhanced international
role of euro
(2), (3) + 0.4 % p.a.
Macroeconomic stability
1. Reduced output and inflation
variability
> 0 Due to aggregation
effects
2. Countries with closer trade linkages
exhibit highly correlated business
cycles.
Being a member of a currency union












2. Cost of asymmetric shocks (10) Negligible for
most EU
members
For some (B, SF, I, F,
E) some SR effects of
monetary policy32
3. Higher real exchange rate
persistence
(15) Real exchange rates
adjust more slowly to
shocks in members of
currency unions






5. Potential for political tensions (16) According to (16)
even civil war not
excluded.
Notes:
(1) European Commission (1990).
(2) Portes, Richard and Rey, Hélène (1998).
(3) Portes, Richard (2000).
(4) Heinemann, Friedrich and Jopp, Mathias, (2002).
(5) De Gregorio, José (1999).
(6) Sekkat, Khalid (1998).
(7) Eduard Hochreiter, Riccardo Rovelli and Georg Winckler (1996).
(8) Eduard Hochreiter and Riccardo Rovelli (2001).
(9) Crespo-Cuaresma, Jesús, Dimitz, Marie Antoinette and Ritzberger-Grünwald,
Doris(2002)
(10)  Schuberth, Helene and Wehinger, Gert (1998).
(11)  Frankel and Rose (1997)
(12)  Frankel and Rose (1998)
(13)  Fatas (1997)
(14)  Clark and van Wincoop (2001)
(15)  Rose and Engel (2001)
(16)  Feldstein (1997, 1998)
                                                
12  Assuming countries´ inflation rates converged already before MU, single market in operation and unified
(remunerated or non-remunerated reserve requirements). Under these conditions SE loss is dependent on
difference between capital share in common central bank and the regions´ relative bank note circulation.Documentos de Trabajo
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